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This paper proposes a probabilistic approach to public debt sustainability analy-
sis (DSA) using “fan charts.” These depict the magnitude of risks—upside and 
downside—surrounding public debt projections as a result of uncertain economic 
conditions and policies. We propose a simulation algorithm for the path of public 
debt under realistic shock configurations, combining pure economic disturbances 
(to growth, interest rates, and exchange rates), the endogenous policy response to 
these, and the possible shocks arising from fiscal policy itself. The paper empha-
sizes the role of fiscal behavior, as well as the structure of disturbances facing the 
economy and due to fiscal policy, in shaping the risk profile of public debt. Fan 
charts for debt are derived from the “marriage” between the pattern of shocks on 
the one hand and the endogenous response of fiscal policy on the other. Applications 
to Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey are used to illustrate the 
approach and its limitations. [JEL H62, H63, C15, E62]
I
n the public debt context, a sustainable position is often viewed as one where the gov-
ernment (or public sector) is solvent. To be deemed solvent, a government must be 
expected to honor current and future financial obligations, including the implicit com-
mitment to continue providing certain public goods, services, and transfers in the future. 
Solvency thus implies that the present value of government disbursements (including 
inherited debt amortization, interest payments, and non-interest expenditure) should not 
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exceed the present value of revenues or, equivalently, that the present value of future 
revenues net of non-interest spending (the primary balances) should at least cover the 
existing public debt. The intertemporal budget constraint and the relationship between 
the primary balance and the public debt have therefore been at the center of the literature 
on debt sustainability.
In practice, the notion of sustainability is less straightforward than it appears. 
First, at a conceptual level, it always implies a judgment as to what constitutes an 
acceptable strategy for the government to ultimately satisfy its intertemporal budget 
constraint (Mendoza and Oviedo, 2004). By definition, solvency excludes outright 
default or forced restructuring.1 Yet most analysts would also exclude the inflation 
tax from the set of acceptable strategies, limiting the latter to adjustments in the 
primary balance. Hence, solvency is only a necessary condition for sustainability, 
and defining sufficient conditions involves judgment. Second, at a technical level, 
the forward-looking nature of solvency makes it difficult to assess. No one knows 
for sure the primary surplus a government will be able (or willing) to generate in 
5, 10, or 20 years, nor the future path of interest rates, inflation, and productivity 
growth over that period. Absent uncertainty, of course, assessing solvency would 
be a mere arithmetical exercise. In reality, however, it requires making judgments 
under uncertainty, as well as recognizing that such judgments are subject to risk.
Concrete assessments of debt sustainability—including those performed by 
IMF country teams—rely on medium-term simulations of the debt-to-GDP ratio 
given specific macroeconomic forecasts and fiscal policy assumptions. In the 
absence of reliable sustainability thresholds, however, such estimates do not in 
themselves allow for determination of the sustainability of a particular debt posi-
tion. Instead, the expected dynamics of the debt-to-GDP ratio over the medium term 
(generally 5 to 10 years) are interpreted as a signal of whether underlying policies 
can be sustained under plausible macroeconomic conditions without endangering 
solvency. Specifically, a declining trend in the debt ratio signals that government 
policies are unlikely to jeopardize sustainability, whereas a positive trend or even 
stabilization at a high level may motivate concerns about sustainability, especially 
if other factors—such as the fiscal adjustment needed to stabilize or reduce the debt 
ratio—point to likely difficulties in keeping debt under control.
Uncertainty about future macroeconomic conditions and fiscal policy inevitably 
weakens the basis for drawing compelling policy conclusions using such analyses. 
This paper proposes a methodology that improves our understanding of the risks 
surrounding debt dynamics, and explicitly acknowledges the probabilistic nature of 
debt sustainability analysis (DSA) exercises. A more nuanced and credible assess-
ment of sustainability results.
Of course, standard DSA does recognize the importance of uncertainty and 
appraises risks to the baseline debt projection by simulating alternative debt paths 
under less favorable conditions—so-called bound tests. This approach to risk 
assessment is entirely deterministic, however, involving a set of scenarios in which 
one key variable at a time is hit by an adverse shock—including lower growth, 
1Solvency is generally defined as the ability to meet financial obligations on time.PRIMARy SuRPLuS BEhAVIOR AnD RISkS tO fISCAL SuStAInABILIty
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higher interest rates, a lower primary balance, and exogenous debt increases, such 
as those resulting from exchange rate depreciation or the recognition of off-budget 
obligations. The calibration of the shocks generally uses a multiple or fraction of 
the unconditional variance of the underlying series.
The bound-tests approach gives a broad sense of the sensitivity of the sustain-
ability assessment to adverse developments, but significant methodological limita-
tions undermine its credibility and operational relevance. First, both the correlations 
among shocks and the joint dynamic response of the variables relevant for debt 
dynamics are ignored. Indeed, simulated deterministic disturbances can realisti-
cally be of only two types: large and transitory, or small and permanent.2 Second, 
fiscal policy is assumed not to react to the simulated economic developments, as if 
a deterministic policy process could reasonably prevail in an intrinsically stochastic 
environment. Third, in an uncertain world, of course, each bound test formally has 
a near-zero probability of occurrence, making any meaningful quantification of risk 
impossible.
Measuring risk to debt dynamics requires a stochastic simulation apparatus 
whereby bound tests covering a range of shock combinations can be generated. 
With a framework capable of randomly generating a large sample of bound tests, 
frequency distributions of the debt ratio can be derived for each year of a projection, 
yielding an explicitly probabilistic assessment of debt sustainability. Specifically, 
we use “fan charts” to depict confidence bands for varying degrees of uncertainty 
around the median projection, which are more informative than assessments based 
solely on the trend in the central projection for debt.
This paper proposes a stochastic DSA algorithm along these lines. The algo-
rithm preserves a certain degree of standardization while allowing for country-
specific risk factors to be reflected. To illustrate its versatility, it is applied to five 
emerging market countries with fairly different risk profiles, namely, Argentina, 
Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey.
The paper also draws on earlier work looking at public debt sustainability in 
relation to primary surplus behavior. IMF (2003) focuses on determining debt 
thresholds beyond which sustainability could be considered at risk given average 
fiscal behavior. The same study introduces the concept of “overborrowing,” defined 
as the excess of current public debt over the annuity value of future primary sur-
pluses. Using an expanded version of the data set in IMF (2003), Abiad and Ostry 
(2005) refine the estimations of fiscal reaction functions (including a richer set of 
political and institutional variables) and of the determinants of overborrowing, and 
calculate the impact on sustainable debt levels of a variety of fiscal and institutional 
reforms. The present paper marries the approach to fiscal policy reaction functions 
in Abiad and Ostry and the stochastic analysis of debt issues in Garcia and Rigobon 
(2005) and Penalver and Thwaites (2004). These latter papers, by focusing on 
higher-frequency macroeconomic data, pay insufficient attention to the constraints 
on the evolution of public debt created by the endogenous response of fiscal policy 
2Recent adjustments to the IMF’s DSA template placed greater emphasis on small and permanent 
shocks, leaving only exogenous debt increases as large and temporary disturbances.Oya Celasun, Xavier Debrun, and Jonathan D. Ostry
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to debt shocks. An appendix containing technical details of our analysis is available 
in an earlier version of this paper (Celasun, Debrun, and Ostry, 2006).
I.  Debt Sustainability Analysis and Risk
This section compares deterministic DSA with stochastic approaches, highlight-
ing the value added of the latter over the former. As previously mentioned, a given 
debt position is sustainable as long as it does not exceed the present value of all 
future primary surpluses. Because the path of primary surpluses over the indefinite 
future is essentially unknown, however, implementing this definition is a tremen-
dous challenge, calling for operational alternatives.
DSA Frameworks
The time horizon for macroeconomic projections rarely extends beyond a few years, 
so the solvency concept is typically operationalized by asserting that sustainability 
is not in jeopardy if the expected path of primary surpluses causes the debt-to-GDP 
ratio to decline over the simulation horizon. Concerns about sustainability arise if 
the debt ratio trends upward or if it stabilizes at a high level relative to peer coun-
tries or relative to its own historical track record; sustainability could also be called 
into question if the magnitude of fiscal adjustment required to stabilize the debt 
ratio seems excessive. In the standard DSA setup, the assessment does not relate 
to the sustainability of a particular debt position but to whether given policies lead 
to particular trends in the debt-to-GDP ratio, which may in turn motivate calls for 
policy corrections.
A key issue with the DSA as just described is the omission of uncertainty—for 
example, about income growth, interest rates, fiscal policies, exchange rates, or 
even the recognition of contingent liabilities. A natural response is to subject the 
DSA’s baseline projection to a series of shocks (bound tests) that deteriorate the out-
look. The standard bound-testing approach is deterministic, however, and limited to 
either isolated shocks or ad hoc combinations of them. Whereas the unconditional 
variance of the underlying series determines the magnitude of the simulated distur-
bances, actual covariances—especially between fiscal and nonfiscal variables—are 
ignored. This may lead to severely underestimating risks to debt sustainability if 
adverse shocks—say to growth, interest rates, and exchange rates—combine in an 
explosive cocktail for debt dynamics.3
Calibrating deterministic bound tests to reflect economic and policy patterns 
observed in a given economy thus constitutes another challenge for the standard DSA 
framework. One possibility is to devise a small number of standardized scenarios— 
where isolated shocks are expressed as a proportion of the historical standard 
deviations of the variables—such that both the shock itself and the resulting debt 
path appear plausible in probabilistic terms (IMF, 2003). By its nature, this approach 
lends itself to the construction of bound tests applicable to many different countries, 
and requires only a fairly parsimonious data set.
3That would be the case if a slowdown in economic activity were typically followed by a depreciation 
of the currency, rising interest rates, and a deteriorating primary balance.PRIMARy SuRPLuS BEhAVIOR AnD RISkS tO fISCAL SuStAInABILIty
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For the sake of illustration, the deterministic bound-testing exercise is presented 
in Figure 1 for South Africa over 2004–10. The template provides debt paths cor-
responding to several scenarios: the baseline; small but permanent adverse shocks 
to real GDP growth, the real interest rate, and the primary balance; a combination 
of these three shocks; and two large temporary disturbances—namely, a 30 percent 
real depreciation and a shock to the debt stock equivalent to 10 percent of GDP. In 
line with South Africa’s stable economic environment and low external indebted-
ness, the selected bound tests suggest fairly low risks to public debt sustainability 
over the medium term (Debrun, 2005b).
Figure 1.  South Africa: IMF Standard Debt Sustainability Analysis, 2004–10
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Benefits of an Explicit Risk Assessment
One drawback of the deterministic bound-testing approach is that the underlying 
scenarios hardly ever follow shock patterns observed in the economy. Specifically, 
the method ignores co-movements among the determinants of debt dynamics, even 
though such co-movements are central in the stability of the debt ratio (see Goldfajn, 
2005). Furthermore, the standardization of those tests implies fairly different degrees 
of realism across countries. Because the likelihood of the resulting debt paths can-
not be precisely assessed, observers have no choice but to judge the plausibility of 
these bound tests on the basis of their core assumptions—for example, a growth 
slowdown without repercussions on interest rates or fiscal policy—rather than on 
their probabilistic merits in terms of debt outcomes.
A legitimate question is thus to ask whether a diagnostic based on a few stylized 
scenarios is robust to more realistic constellations of shocks. If a joint distribution 
of economic disturbances can be estimated for the country under review, stochastic 
simulations reflecting actual co-movements of shocks in the economy can produce 
a sample of more realistic bound tests from which country-specific frequency distri-
butions of debt can be derived. These frequency distributions provide a quantitative 
assessment of the risks to the baseline debt projections that may ultimately help 
refine fiscal policy recommendations.
Another issue is the extent to which the sustainability diagnostic reflects plausi-
ble fiscal policy behavior and accounts for the fact that fiscal policy itself is a source 
of uncertainty. Commonly used DSA scenarios assume that fiscal policy is invariant 
to the stylized shocks. This assumption contributes to the policy dialogue by high-
lighting the consequences of policy inaction, but there are strong a priori grounds 
as well as ample evidence that the primary balance tends to respond systemati-
cally to variations in public debt and to the business cycle, among other factors. 
Ignoring this feedback may thus distort the risk assessment.4 In particular, assuming 
a constant primary surplus in the face of business cycle fluctuations reduces the 
estimated risk to debt dynamics because slowdowns are generally accompanied 
by fiscal easing, whereas expansions often fail to improve the primary balance. 
Also, the estimated residuals of the reaction functions provide information on the 
stability of fiscal behavior, with erratic policy impulses being another independent 
source of uncertainty. Conversely, the passive policy assumption fails to capture 
the stabilizing response of the primary surplus to the debt itself, thereby increasing 
estimated risks to debt.
In addition to improved reliability of the risk analysis, accounting for system-
atic features of the policy process should lead policy advice to focus more on fiscal 
effort (measured as the departure from the estimated reaction function) rather than 
on the unconditional change in the fiscal balance. Deviations of actual policies from 
the benchmark provided by the estimated reaction function may prove useful in 
assessing such effort, and thereby assessing the room for fiscal adjustment (Abiad 
and Ostry, 2005; and Debrun, 2005a). Table 1 summarizes some key differences 
between the usual DSA framework and the extended DSA proposed in this paper.
4Our simulation tool can, however, accommodate any normative policy scenario, including the constant 
policy assumption.PRIMARy SuRPLuS BEhAVIOR AnD RISkS tO fISCAL SuStAInABILIty
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The Simulation Algorithm: Overview and Limitations
The simulation algorithm presented here seeks to satisfy three main objectives:   
(1) provide a sensible way to account for fiscal behavior and simulate changes to 
it, (2) provide a tool easily applicable to different emerging market countries while 
referring to a common benchmark for policy assessment, and (3) keep data require-
ments close to those in the standard DSA.
The first objective uses the fiscal reaction function as an essential building 
block. The second points to panel data techniques to estimate average behavior 
across a group of countries to serve as a “positive” benchmark for each individual 
member of the group. The third suggests relying mainly on annual data.
These objectives impose a significant departure from existing algorithms.5 
Specifically, there is a need to initially separate the estimation of the fiscal reac-
tion function from that of the other economic relationships before merging them 
again when simulating the behavior of the public debt ratio. There are (at least) two 
compelling reasons for doing so. First, the estimation of the variance-covariance 
Table 1.  Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) and Risk Assessment
  Deterministic Bound Testing   Probabilistic Approach  
  (commonly used DSA)  (used in this paper)
Basis of  
diagnostic 
 










Sources: IMF and authors’ calculations.
Large number of random shock 
constellations drawn from an 
estimated joint distribution; 
endogenous fiscal policy.
Based directly on the estimated 
joint distribution of distur-
bances (country specific). 
 
Frequency distributions of the 
debt ratio over time; “fan 
charts.” 
Better reflection of country speci-
ficity (in terms of shocks and 
fiscal policy behavior); explic-
itly probabilistic output.
A few stylized, isolated shocks; 
exogenous policies. 
 
Fraction or multiple of historical standard 
deviations of underlying variables; 
calibration based on the likelihood of 
the resulting debt path for a sample of 
emerging market economies.
Large temporary shocks provide a 
probabilistic upper bound to the debt 
ratio; small permanent shocks delineate 
interval of most probable outcomes.
Amenable to standardized bound tests 
across countries; low data requirement. 
 
5IMF (2003) develops a tractable stochastic simulation tool that shares many features with subsequent 
research, including ours. However, this algorithm relies on annual data for all relevant variables, placing 
a premium on the availability of long and stable time series. In contrast, the simulation tools developed 
by Penalver and Thwaites (2004) and Garcia and Rigobon (2005), among others, require high-frequency 
data, including for fiscal variables. Such data requirements limit the number of countries to which these 
algorithms can be applied. To better internalize data constraints, we focus on a shorter time span (during 
which regime shifts and structural changes are less likely) while keeping annual fiscal data at the center of 
the analysis. This increases the number of countries to which our algorithm can be applied.Oya Celasun, Xavier Debrun, and Jonathan D. Ostry
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matrix of shocks inevitably relies on time-series techniques (an unrestricted Vector 
Auto-Regression or VAR model) that demand data more frequent than annual data. 
However, in contrast to financial variables and GDP, budgetary data at such fre-
quency are often either unavailable or unreliable for the purpose of policy evalu-
ation, exhibiting a very high noise-to-signal ratio.6 The second reason is that the 
VAR framework restricts the specification of the reaction function in undesirable 
ways; for example, the primary surplus responds to contemporaneous variations in 
the output gap, not lagged ones, as imposed by the VAR framework.
Accordingly, our algorithm comprises three building blocks, as follows:
1.  A fiscal reaction function—in the positive sense of a description of average fis-
cal policy patterns—is estimated for a panel of emerging market economies with 
annual data. In line with the literature, the specification is given by
p d ygap X t i t i t i t i t i i t , , , , , , = + + + + + = − α ρ γ β η ε 0 1 1 1 1 1 ,..., , ,..., , ( ) T i N =
where pi,t is the ratio of the primary balance to GDP in country i and year t; di,t−1 
is the public debt-to-GDP ratio observed at the end of period t − 1; ygapi,t is 
the output gap; ηi is an unobserved, country fixed effect; and Xi,t is a vector of 
control variables.
2.  For each country, we estimate an unrestricted VAR model comprising the   
nonfiscal determinants of public debt dynamics. Formally, we have Yt = γ0 + 
  γ ξ k t k k
p
t Y − = ∑ + 1 , where Yt = (rt
us, rt, gt, zt), and γk is a vector of coefficients; rus 
denotes the real foreign interest rate; r, the real domestic interest rate; g, the 
real GDP growth rate; z, the (log of the) real effective exchange rate; and ξ 
is a vector of well-behaved error terms: ξt ∼ N(0,Ω). This model serves two 
purposes.  First,  the  variance-covariance  matrix  of  residuals  Ω  character-
izes the joint statistical properties of the contemporaneous, nonfiscal distur-
bances affecting debt dynamics. Specifically, the simulations use a sequence 
of random vectors ξ ˆ
t+1, . . . , ξ ˆ
T such that ∀ τ ∈ [t + 1, T]; ξ ˆ
τ = Wυτ, where 
υτ ∼ N(0,1); and W is such that Ω = W′W (W is the Choleski factorization of 
Ω). Second, the VAR generates forecasts of Y consistent with the simulated 
shocks. Because shocks occur each period, the VAR produces joint dynamic 
responses of all elements in Y. It should be noted that the method is not sensi-
tive to the ordering of variables in the VAR. Ordering matters only to the extent 
that one tries to capture causal relationships between innovations and the other 
variables (for example, for impulse response functions). In the present context, 
stochastic simulation results are shaped by the variance-covariance matrix of 
reduced-form errors Ω, which is unique (see also Garcia and Rigobon, 2005).
3.  For each simulated constellation of shocks, quarterly VAR projections are annu-
alized, and the simulated annual output gap results from the growth differential 
between predicted GDP growth and the (annualized) steady-state growth rate 
6Higher-frequency budgetary data (quarterly or monthly) serve cash management purposes. Even 
though countries with IMF-supported programs or greater leeway to vote for supplementals during the 
budget year may well undertake policy corrections on a quarterly basis in response to shocks or slippages, 
the overall policy stance still tends to be reflected in the annual figures. Wyplosz (2005) finds that standard 
reaction functions fit monthly data for Brazil very poorly.PRIMARy SuRPLuS BEhAVIOR AnD RISkS tO fISCAL SuStAInABILIty
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produced by the VAR (to ensure that shocks to the output gap are zero on aver-
age). The corresponding debt path can then be calculated recursively using equa-
tion (1) and the conventional stock-flow identity
d g r z d r d t t t
us
t t t t ≡ + ( ) + ( ) + ( ) + + ( )
−
− − 1 1 1 1
1
1 1 ∆ *   


− + p s t t,
where dt* captures the foreign currency–denominated debt; d ˜
t designates the 
public debt in domestic currency; and st, stock-flow adjustments—for instance, 
due to the recognition of contingent liabilities or the realization of assets. Notice 
that in each simulation, the primary surplus incorporates a fiscal policy shock   
ϕi,t ∼ N(0, σ2
ϕi), where σ2
ϕi is the country-specific variance of the reaction func-
tion’s residuals.
This algorithm can produce an arbitrarily large number of debt paths corre-
sponding to different shock constellations. Frequency distributions of the debt ratio 
can then be obtained for each year of projection, and used to draw fan charts and the 
probabilistic sustainability indicators discussed in Section III.
Results from using this algorithm are still subject to a number of limitations. 
First, in many emerging market economies, identifying stable economic relation-
ships is a challenge: the lack of long time series combined with ongoing structural 
change and shifts in policy regime inevitably reduce the reliability of econometric 
estimates for predicting future developments. A related issue is that the uncertainty 
captured by econometric models is not limited to the behavior of residuals, but 
also finds an expression in the standard errors of estimated coefficients. One way 
to incorporate this in our algorithm and provide a more encompassing assessment 
of risk would be to randomize the coefficients of the underlying economic model. 
However, this raises a number of concerns. One is that randomization could yield 
a nontrivial number of parameter constellations associated with unstable solutions 
for the system. Such an approach, moreover, would likely obfuscate rather than illu-
minate policy discussions. Beyond this, compounding two very different sources of 
uncertainty—well-identified shocks on key variables on the one hand and doubts 
about the reliability of the model used to discipline our projections on the other—
would considerably reduce the transparency of the simulation procedure and com-
plicate the interpretation of the results. One nevertheless needs to remain aware that 
the risk assessment emerging from our method is probably a lower bound.
Second,  extreme  situations—such  as  crises—are  bound  to  remain  low- 
probability events in this framework because the simulated shocks are drawn from 
a joint normal distribution. The normality assumption may be at odds with a more 
frequent occurrence of adverse events (asymmetric distribution of shocks) or the 
greater likelihood of extreme events (“fat tails”) in some countries or at certain 
times. However, explicitly dealing with nonnormal disturbances could undermine 
the simplicity and cross-country comparability of the current approach. Moreover, 
it would presume that future disturbances are bound to resemble past ones. That 
said, evidence of nonnormal shock distributions should encourage a discussion of 
the likely implications on the balance of risk reflected in our fan charts.
Third, the combination of annual and quarterly data shuts off any feedback 
effect of fiscal policy on economic variables (the causation runs only in the other Oya Celasun, Xavier Debrun, and Jonathan D. Ostry
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direction) and, in particular, interest rates (through credibility effects) and growth 
(through the quality of fiscal policy). This may be an important issue if fiscal reforms, 
for example, are likely to produce significant changes in the future course of growth 
and interest rate spreads. Our simulation tool allows imposing such effects on the 
results by overriding the steady-state values from the VAR.
The next section turns to the first building block of our model and provides a 
benchmark fiscal reaction function for a group of emerging market economies.
II.  Debt Dynamics and the Conduct of Fiscal Policy
As shown by Bohn (1998), governments concerned with solvency would be 
expected to raise the primary balance in response to an increase in the public debt-
to-GDP ratio. If all other determinants of fiscal policy are stationary, the positive 
correlation between debt and the primary surplus is sufficient to guarantee that the 
debt ratio will revert to some finite steady-state value. This section describes the 
estimation of fiscal reaction functions for a group of emerging market economies 
over 1990–2004, with regressors including debt and a range of other economic, 
policy, and institutional variables of interest.
Primary Surplus Behavior and Public Debt Sustainability
A growing number of studies have estimated fiscal reaction functions (Mélitz, 1997; 
Galí and Perotti, 2003; IMF, 2003 and 2004; and Wyplosz, 2005, among others). The 
aim has been to identify a stable relationship between fiscal policy (measured by 
the primary balance) and various potential determinants. Such an exercise does not 
necessarily attempt to establish causality; the idea is rather to extract information 
on the key considerations that may shape and be correlated with policy decisions. 
Debt sustainability is expected to be one of those considerations, along with cycli-
cal developments and institutions affecting a government’s incentives. Accordingly, 
a version of equation (1) is commonly estimated.
One difficulty with estimating fiscal rules is the scarcity of relevant budgetary 
data, which has led researchers to use panel data methods. The most meaningful 
data from the perspective of policy evaluation are available annually, in line with 
the budget procedure of most countries. Although fiscal policy adjustments may 
occur more frequently, these signals are blurred by the intrinsically noisy nature of 
high-frequency budgetary data.7
Panel estimation assumes similar fiscal behavior across countries. To account 
for possible heterogeneity, we control for a large number of potential determinants 
of fiscal policy, and also explore the possibility of nonlinear relationships between 
the primary balance and some of its determinants.
Estimating Fiscal Reaction Functions
In line with the literature, the reaction function we estimate, given in equation (1), 
relates the annual primary fiscal balance to the outstanding level of public debt, the 
7One notable exception is in the case of an IMF-supported program, where quarterly reviews of policy 
implementation take place.PRIMARy SuRPLuS BEhAVIOR AnD RISkS tO fISCAL SuStAInABILIty
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gap between actual and trend output, and a number of potentially important driv-
ers of the primary balance in emerging market economies. These include real oil 
prices in oil exporters, an index of institutional quality, and two indicator variables 
accounting for whether the country is in a state of sovereign default and whether it 
is committed to an IMF-supported program.
The estimation of equation (1) needs to take into account three sources of endo-
geneity bias. The first is simply the endogeneity of the output gap with respect to 
contemporaneous fiscal policy shocks, εi,t. The remaining two sources stem from 
the dependence of lagged debt on past values of the primary surplus. As to the 
second of the three sources, clearly the lagged debt level, di,t−1, will necessarily be 
correlated with the country-specific and time-invariant determinants of primary 
surpluses, ηi; countries able to generate higher surpluses on average—captured 
by higher values of the fixed effects ηi—will tend to have a lower level of public 
debt, and if this is not properly accounted for, the negative correlation between debt 
levels and the unobserved country fixed effects would exert a downward bias on 
the estimated primary surplus response to debt. As to the third source of endoge-
neity, to the extent that there is persistence in the idiosyncratic error term, εi,t, the 
dependence of lagged debt on past surpluses will render lagged debt in equation 
(1) endogenous.8
Ideally, one could address these potential endogeneity problems with adequate 
instrumentation. To tackle the first source of endogeneity, the output gap needs to be 
instrumented with variables that are exogenous to the idiosyncratic primary surplus 
shocks. The second source of endogeneity—the endogeneity of debt to the primary 
surplus fixed effects—can in principle be addressed by the inclusion of country 
indicator variables among the regressors, but this method would still be subject 
to the third endogeneity problem if there is strong serial correlation in the idio-
syncratic errors.9 Moreover, the use of country dummies can potentially introduce 
an additional bias, commonly referred to as the small-sample bias of the fixed-
effects estimator.10 By contrast, instrumenting both the output gap and lagged debt 
(with variables that are exogenous to the primary surplus fixed effects and to the 
idiosyncratic errors) would simultaneously address all three potential endogeneity 
problems. That said, reliable instrumental variable (IV)-based estimations require 
the use of suitable exogenous instruments that are strongly correlated with the 
endogenous regressors. Such ideal instruments are difficult to find in our context. 
Moreover, IV-based regressions are generally not very efficient, yielding estimates 
with relatively large standard errors.
8For instance, a positive shock to the surplus in period t − 1, that is, a positive realization of εi,t−1, would 
reduce the debt stock, di,t−1. Thus, persistence in the idiosyncratic policy shocks (serial correlation between 
εi,t−1 and εi,t) would result in a negative correlation between di,t−1 and εi,t.
9The inclusion of country indicator variables addresses the endogeneity of debt to ηi by transforming the 
equation to eliminate ηi. Specifically, including country dummies is equivalent to performing the regression 
on the variables in deviations from country means.
10A large body of literature analyzes the bias of the least squares with dummy variables estimator 
in dynamic models that include the lagged dependent variable as a regressor. The bias of this estimator 
decreases with the time dimension of the sample and the variance of the lagged dependent variable that is 
attributable to factors other than the disturbance terms (see Kiviet, 1995; or Judson and Owen, 1999). Our 
model falls into the category of dynamic panel models, given that lagged debt is among the regressors.Oya Celasun, Xavier Debrun, and Jonathan D. Ostry
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Against this background, our strategy is to estimate five possible specifications. 
The first two, a Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) regression and a 
system Generalized Method of Moments (system GMM) specification, respectively, 
instrument for the output gap and lagged debt, and exclude country dummies. A third 
uses instruments for the output gap only and includes country dummies to account for 
the fixed effects. This specification eliminates the first two sources of endogeneity, but 
not the endogeneity from the persistence in idiosyncratic policy shocks; it should yield 
results similar to the first two methods if the serial correlation in the errors is weak and 
if the small-sample bias associated with the use of country dummies is small.11 Beyond 
this, columns 4–5 in Table 2, discussed below, incorporate nonlinearities to better cap-
ture heterogeneities in fiscal behavior across countries and circumstances.
Estimation Results
The panel presented here comprises 34 countries and a maximum of 15 years (1990–
2004); data on primary balances and public debt levels were obtained from IMF 
country desk economists for the largest available coverage of the fiscal sector.12 For 
the linear reaction function, we present in columns 1–3 of Table 2 three specifica-
tions. The first eliminates the country effects by using first differences and instru-
ments for the lagged change in debt and contemporaneous change in the output gap, 
using as instruments lags of one-year U.S. bond rates, changes in real oil prices, 
lagged fiscal costs of banking crises, and import demand in industrial-country trading 
partners.13 We run a LIML regression, which is preferable to GMM if the instruments 
are not very strong. In the second regression, we implement Blundell-Bond (1998) 
system-GMM (SGMM), which jointly estimates the level and differenced forms of 
the equation, using lagged differences and levels of the endogenous regressors as 
instruments in addition to the exogenous instruments used in the LIML regression. 
Third, we estimate a version with country dummies, instrumenting only the output 
gap with import demand in industrialized trade partners (GMM-DV).
All three estimations suggest a positive response of primary surpluses to the 
debt. With a positive coefficient on the output gap, primary balances are estimated 
to be countercyclical. However, this effect is driven mostly by the worsening of the 
balance during recessions rather than improvements during booms, as discussed 
below in the context of the nonlinear specification. IMF-supported programs encour-
age countries to run higher surpluses. And countries in default run larger primary 
balances, reflecting their restricted market access.
The estimated coefficient of the index of institutional quality is mostly nega-
tive, but significant only in the GMM-DV regression. An interesting observation is 
that the estimated country fixed effects in the GMM-DV regression are positively 
correlated with the average institutional quality over the sample period (Figure 2), 
suggesting that countries with stronger institutions run larger primary balances on 
11Monte Carlo simulations suggest that the magnitude of the (positive) bias on ρ is less than 20–30 percent 
of the true coefficient (Celasun and Kang, 2006).
12See Celasun, Debrun, and Ostry (2006) for a description of the data set.
13The fiscal costs of banking crises typically take the form of below-the-line expenditures, thereby 
increasing the public debt burden without affecting recorded primary surpluses.PRIMARy SuRPLuS BEhAVIOR AnD RISkS tO fISCAL SuStAInABILIty
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Table 2.  Estimates of the Fiscal Reaction Function, 1990–2004
Dependent Variable: Level or Difference of the Primary Fiscal Balance
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  LIML  System-  GMM  LIML  GMM 
  (Difference)  GMM  with DV  (Difference)  with DV
Lagged debt  0.039  0.030***  0.046***  0.121  0.097***
    [0.032]  [0.007]  [0.008]  [0.172]  [0.036]
Output gap  0.104  0.217***  0.328***
    [0.109]  [0.072]  [0.113]
Real oil price  0.481***  0.084**  0.354***  0.487***  0.361***
    [0.072]  [0.030]  [0.082]  [0.112]  [0.086]
Institutions  0.374  −0.219  −0.675***  0.463  −0.380
    [0.484]  [0.322]  [0.258]  [0.445]  [0.256]
IMF program  0.765**  1.121  1.108***  0.777**  0.939**
    [0.347]  [0.689]  [0.328]  [0.344]  [0.328]
Default  0.870**  0.884  1.190***  0.749***  1.077***
    [0.351]  [0.813]  [0.401]  [0.297]  [0.368]
Debt spline        −0.108  −0.062*
  (50 percent)        [0.194]  [0.037]
Positive output gap        −0.092  0.181
          [0.358]  [0.631]
Negative output gap        0.258  0.268
          [0.246]  [0.225]
Constant    −0.684  −0.963    −3.628
      [1.479]  [1.138]    [2.892]
Country dummies  No  No  Yes  No  Yes
Observations  349  399  418  368  418
Hansen test (P-value)  0.84  1.00  0.45  —  0.03
AR(1) test (P-value)    0.05
AR(2) test (P-value)    0.09
Cragg-Donald statistic  7.23    19.63  1.96
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: System-GMM = system Generalized Method of Moments; LIML = Limited Information 
Maximum Likelihood. Standard errors are in brackets. * denotes significance at 10 percent; ** at 5 per-
cent; *** at 1 percent. P-values of the test statistics are reported for the tests of overidentifying restric-
tions and the tests of serial correlation in the residuals of the difference equation in the system-GMM 
regressions (the AR tests). In the LIML regression in the first column, the second and third lags of U.S. 
one-year bond rates, second and third lags of the changes in real oil prices, lagged fiscal banking crisis 
costs, and the contemporaneous value of trade partners’ import demand were used as instruments for 
lagged debt and the output gap. The Blundell and Bond (1998) system-GMM regression in column 2 
uses the second lags of the output gap and debt, in addition to the banking fiscal cost measure and the 
trade partners’ import demand. The third column presents a GMM regression with country dummies, 
where the output gap is instrumented with the contemporaneous and lagged values of trade partners’ 
import demand. The equation in column 4 is exactly identified, hence there is no test of overidentifying 
restrictions. The instruments include lagged fiscal banking crisis costs, the contemporaneous value of 
trade partners’ import demand, the interaction of these variables with a dummy that indicates whether 
debt exceeds 50 percent, and a dummy that indicates whether the output gap is positive. The estimation 
in column 5 instruments only for the positive and negative output gap terms, using the interactions of 
the trade partners’ import demand measure.Oya Celasun, Xavier Debrun, and Jonathan D. Ostry
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average. The negative estimated impact of institutions may stem from the fact that 
improvements in institutional quality are typically associated with decreases in bor-
rowing costs, implying that countries would need to run smaller primary balances 
to service a given level of debt as their institutions improve.
Columns 4 and 5 in Table 2 present estimates of the nonlinear fiscal reaction 
function, which allows for a “kinked” response to debt at 50 percent of GDP, and a 
different response to the output gap depending on the latter’s sign.14 The specifica-
tion takes the form
p d D d P yg i t i t i t i t
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β η ε 2
where Pit and Nit are dummy variables whether the output gap is positive or nega-
tive, respectively.
The larger number of parameters and required instruments limits the choice of 
estimation methods.15 Thus, for this specification, we present a LIML regression 
that excludes country dummies and uses instruments for lagged debt and the output 
gap,16 and a GMM regression that includes country dummies and instruments only 
for the (negative and positive) gap terms.
14Previous work suggests a structural shift in the primary surplus equation when debt reaches 50 percent of 
GDP and a different response of the surplus depending on the sign of the output gap (Abiad and Ostry, 2005).
15Given the interaction terms in the specification, the number of excluded instruments needed for the 
nonlinear specification is double that needed for the linear specification.
16In the LIML estimation in column 4, the banking-crisis fiscal cost measure and its interaction with Di,t−1 
were used to instrument for lagged debt and splined debt. The interactions of the import demand measure with 
Pi,t and Ni,t were used as instruments for the gap measures. This equation was thus exactly identified.
Sources: Authors’ calculations; International Country Risk Guide; and Bloomberg. 
Notes: The left panel plots the estimated country fixed effects in the GMM-DV regression against 
average institutional quality over the sample period. The right panel plots EMBI spreads against institutional 
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Although the findings are less precise than those obtained for equation (1), 
they qualitatively confirm that the response to debt is stronger when debt is less 
than 50 percent of GDP, and that the response to booms and recessions is asym-
metric. In particular, the worsening in primary balances during recessions exceeds 
the improvements attained during economic booms.
For our baseline calibration exercise in the next section, we use the GMM-DV 
parameter estimates (column 3), which are more precise. Estimated country fixed 
effects are also useful for gauging heterogeneity across countries. SGMM estimates 
(column 2) are also proposed as a robustness check. For simulations using the non-
linear specification, we use the GMM-DV estimates in column 5.
III.  Risks to Debt Sustainability in Five Emerging Market Economies
This section proposes various prospective and retrospective risk analyses of public 
debt in five emerging market economies with fairly different risk profiles: Argentina, 
Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey. After a discussion of the calibration, we 
apply the simulation algorithm outlined in Section I to generate a sample of 1,000 
simulations from which we derive frequency distributions of public debt. We then 
discuss possible tools of analysis—fan charts and a summary indicator of debt 
sustainability. Finally, we examine the sensitivity of the risk analysis to variations 
in the underlying assumptions.
Calibrating the Simulations
For a given country, all simulations assume the same joint distribution of distur-
bances and co-movements among the variables.
The fiscal reaction function combines both standardized and country-specific 
features as follows—an upper “hat” designates parameter estimates obtained in 
Section II as well as the corresponding predictions:
ˆ ˆ ˆ , , , , , p d ygap i t i t i t i t i t + + + − + = + + + τ τ τ τ ρ γ ϕ Λ 1 + + = τ τ , ,..., , ( ) for 1 5 3
with Λi,t+τ = p ˆi,t − ρ ˆdi,t−1 − γ ˆ ygapi,t + κi,t+τ; and ϕi,t+τ, a policy shock drawn from a 
mean-zero normal distribution with variance equal to the country-specific variance 
of residuals.17
Equation (3) splits fiscal policy into an automatic, a predetermined, and a ran-
dom part. The automatic component follows the average response of the primary 
balance to the public debt and to the output gap, and is considered identical for all 
countries. The predetermined part, summarized by Λi,t+τ, captures the impact of 
all other determinants of the primary surplus, including institutional quality, the 
existence of an IMF-supported economic program, a default/restructuring option, 
and, if relevant, the budgetary effect of oil-price fluctuations. By default, κi,t+τ = 0 
so that Λi,t+τ is a country-specific constant providing an anchor to simulated pri-
mary balance paths. We also allow for non-zero, time-varying values for κi,t+τ to 
17Recall that the fiscal disturbance is assumed to be orthogonal to economic developments.Oya Celasun, Xavier Debrun, and Jonathan D. Ostry
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account for specific information about future policy changes, such as those related 
to institutional reforms likely to affect fiscal performance, the adoption of an IMF- 
supported adjustment program, or, alternatively, discretionary impulses envisaged 
in medium-term budget plans. The estimated reaction functions discussed in Section 
II may provide some guidance for the calibration of κi,t+τ.
Although this paper emphasizes the usefulness of estimated fiscal reaction 
functions, the simulation framework can accommodate a range of policy behavior, 
including normative scenarios (for example, constant primary surplus or program 
targets). Where long data series are available, parameters corresponding to country-
specific estimates of the fiscal reaction function can also be used. Finally, it is worth 
noting that deterministic stress tests representing shocks ignored in the empirical 
model, such as the materialization of contingent liabilities or other “fat tail” events, 
can be combined with the stochastic analysis (see Debrun, 2005b).
Baseline Scenarios
Our baseline scenarios allow only for automatic responses of the primary balance 
to output shocks and public debt developments. One issue, however, is that Λi,t+τ 
incorporates the residual of the reaction function in year t. The discrepancy between 
the predicted surplus and actual behavior may result from discretionary slippages 
or adjustment efforts. Depending on whether that deviation is expected to be per-
manent or temporary, two baseline scenarios can be envisaged.
In the first one (the “constant” policy scenario), any deviation from the pre-
dicted primary surplus in t is assumed to persist over the entire simulation horizon, 
as if the most recent stance signaled a sustained departure from past primary surplus 
behavior (in that case, κi,t+τ = 0 over the entire simulation horizon). That scenario 
is reminiscent of the constant policy scenario commonly found in deterministic 
DSAs, although our framework freezes only the (non-debt-related) discretionary 
part of policy. Alternatively (the “predicted” policy scenario below), recent devia-
tions from the predicted primary surplus may result from purely temporary factors, 
in which case it is more appropriate to assume that the simulated surplus paths fol-
low those predicted by the reaction function (so that κi,t+τ = −ε ˆi,t over the simulation 
horizon). In both cases, surplus behavior follows a common reaction function (see 
Section II). Simulations are performed for t = 2004 and τ = 5, except for Argentina, 
for which we used t = 2005 to account for the debt exchange operation. In line with 
the DSA analysis presented in IMF (2005), for Argentina we used federal-level 
fiscal data rather than the more comprehensive data used for the other countries in 
the sample.
Fan charts summarize risks to debt dynamics by representing the frequency dis-
tribution of a large sample of debt paths generated by means of stochastic simula-
tions (Figure 3). Different colors delineate deciles in the distributions of debt ratios, 
with the zone in dark grey representing a 20 percent confidence interval around the 
median projection, and the overall colored cone, a confidence interval of 80 percent. 
A number of results flow from the charts.
First, compared with the outcome of simple bound tests (reported in Figure 1 in 
the case of South Africa), it appears that these fall within the 40 percent confidence PRIMARy SuRPLuS BEhAVIOR AnD RISkS tO fISCAL SuStAInABILIty
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interval only, confirming that deterministic bound tests imperfectly account for the 
overall magnitude of risks to public debt sustainability. Second, in the five countries, 
the fiscal reaction function generally appears sufficiently responsive to the public 
debt to ensure that the median debt path is sustainable (in the sense that the debt ratio 
is stable or declining over the simulation horizon). However, in most instances, the 
response proves too weak to prevent growing debt ratios in the two upper bands of 
the charts, representing the second and third deciles of the debt ratio. Hence, in those 







































































2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Figure 3.  Fan Charts for Public Debt-to-GDP Ratios in Five Emerging  
Market Economies, 2005–10Oya Celasun, Xavier Debrun, and Jonathan D. Ostry
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cases, there is at least a 30 percent chance that combinations of adverse economic 
and policy shocks may lead to concerns over debt sustainability.
Third, the overall risk profile for the different countries reflects the intrinsic vol-
atility of their respective economies, with less-volatile economies—South Africa, 
for example—exhibiting narrower confidence intervals than others. Of course, our 
assessment is contingent on the relatively short period of time over which the VARs 
are estimated. In particular, wide confidence intervals inevitably reflect past crises, and 
may thus overestimate the true magnitude of risks. This is especially evident in the 
simulations for Argentina and Turkey.
Fourth, the fan charts for Mexico and Turkey illustrate the issue of large residu-
als in the last year of observation. In Mexico’s case, a highly negative residual 
(close to 5 percent of GDP) was observed in 2004, reflecting the lesser sensitivity 
of Mexico’s primary balance to oil prices in comparison with other oil producers in 
the panel. The large increase in real oil prices in 2004 thus showed up as a residual. 
A more detailed analysis of Mexico could discuss alternative scenarios, including 
a reaction function excluding oil prices as a determinant of the primary balance. In 
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fiscal adjustment efforts (Debrun, 2005a). Here, the charts clearly show that sus-
taining such high surpluses (under the constant policy scenario) is key to containing 
the risks to debt sustainability.
Finally, fan charts reflect the intrinsic asymmetry of risks to the debt ratio 
because its level magnifies the impact of growth rate and interest rate shocks. In 
Argentina and Turkey, for instance, the distribution of debt ratios is clearly skewed 
toward the upside, suggesting that the standard response of the primary balance to 
debt may prove insufficiently stabilizing in unfavorable times.
Sustainability Assessments
So far, the value added in our approach has been to produce probability distributions 
of debt at different horizons, rather than a deterministic path for debt.18 But what is 
the policymaker to make of all these distributions? Presumably, recognizing that the 
statement, “There is a 30 percent chance that debt will be below a given ratio to GDP 
in three years’ time, and a 20 percent chance that it will be above another threshold 
over the same horizon,” contains more information than the simple assertion, “Under 
present policies, the debt ratio will decline over time or rise over time,” the policy-
maker is ultimately likely to be interested in whether the country’s debt profile and 
distribution is a problem or not. This is the issue we try to get at in this section, rec-
ognizing that what is an acceptable risk for one policymaker may be an unacceptable 
risk for another.
At a basic level, the prospect of a downward trend in the debt ratio in a deter-
ministic setup corresponds to the probability that the debt ratio will fall below its 
initial value in our stochastic setting. A probability is clearly more informative from 
the point of view of generating useful sustainability indicators than what is avail-
able to the policymaker as a result of a deterministic exercise. But policymakers 
may be interested in more than simply an assessment of whether debt is likely to 
decline or not, particularly if they are very concerned about the possibility that the 
debt ratio could rise (that is, are very averse to upside risk).
Clearly, two countries with the same probability of a declining debt ratio may 
face quite different upside risks for debt. To account for the overall risk profile, 
one can posit a sustainability indicator that combines the probability that debt will 
decline over time with the risk that debt will not rise beyond some specific (or tol-
erable) amount over the same horizon. A plausible indicator could be calculated as 
Pr(dt+τ < dt) × [1 − Pr(dt+τ > (dt + x))], where x is a positive markup over the initial 
public debt dt. The value of the sustainability indicator increases with the likelihood 
of desirable outcomes; that is, a nonincreasing trend, and well-contained upside 
risks. That value has no intrinsic meaning, and it is up to the policymaker to set a 
critical threshold below which the debt situation would be a cause for concern. Such 
a threshold essentially depends on the degree of risk aversion and on the perceived 
need for a reduction in debt. These factors are reflected in the markup x, the level 
18Although not undertaken as an explicit exercise in this paper (but see Abiad and Ostry, 2005), the 
approach can also be used to assess how the distribution of debt shifts in response to changes in policy 
fundamentals that are captured in the estimated reaction function (such as institutional reform, an IMF- 
supported program, etc.).Oya Celasun, Xavier Debrun, and Jonathan D. Ostry
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of upside risk deemed acceptable (that is, how small should Pr(dt+τ > (dt + x)) be in 
order to consider that upside risks are well contained), and the desired probability 
that debt will decline in the future.
Because the sustainability indicator is the product of these two probabilities—
the probability of a declining debt ratio times the probability that the debt ratio will 
not rise by more than the markup—once these probabilities are set, a critical thresh-
old is established. The analyst or the policymaker can then focus on problematic 
cases where the indicator’s value falls below the threshold value of the sustainabil-
ity indicator, and not worry the rest of the time.
In Table 3, we calculate the sustainability indicator for x = 0.1 (10 percent   
of GDP). Which entries in the table are worrisome, and which are benign? To illus-
trate, we pick a threshold value of 0.4. Many combinations of Pr(dt+τ < dt) and   
[1 − Pr(dt+τ > (dt + x))] can deliver such a value. For example, the level of comfort 
associated with that threshold corresponds to a probability of at least 50 percent that 
the debt ratio declines and a probability of less than 20 percent that debt rises by more 
than 10 percent of GDP: 0.40 [= 0.50 × (1 − 0.20)]; alternatively, of course, prob-
abilities of decline of less (more) than 50 percent could be offset by lower (higher) 
probabilities that the debt ratio will rise by more than 10 percent of GDP.
In Table 3, entries where the sustainability index is less than 0.4 are italicized.19 
The indicator underscores vulnerability, particularly in the case of Turkey, which 
stems mainly from the upside risks to debt driven by the shocks—notably to domes-
tic real interest rates and the exchange rate—identified through the VAR. Mitigating 
this vulnerability requires, as shown by a comparison of the constant policy and pre-
dicted policy fan charts, persisting with Turkey’s strong fiscal effort of recent years.
Probabilistic indicators of debt sustainability can prove useful for policymak-
ers if they convey a credible signal that fiscal policy needs to be changed in order 
to reduce the likelihood of adverse outcomes to acceptable levels. A test of our 
approach to sustainability is thus whether it gives appropriate warnings of trouble 
on the eve of a crisis. Given data constraints, we investigate this issue—namely, the 
track record of our sustainability indicator—in three “eve-of-crisis” cases: Argentina 
and Brazil at end-2000 and Turkey at end-1999, using only information available to 
policymakers at the time.20 As a control, we also introduce a retrospective analysis 
of South Africa (at end-2000) to check whether our model would have properly 
differentiated the risks faced by these countries.
The fan charts in Figure 4 point to upside risks in all three crisis countries, with 
Argentina looking particularly vulnerable to explosive outcomes. Turkey’s debt 
dynamics also looked unmanageable under most circumstances, and Brazil’s situa-
tion appeared under control, albeit with significant upside risks.
19More cells would be italicized if the policymaker wanted to reduce the probability of upside risk to, 
say, 10 percent from 20 percent: in that case the problematic entries would be all those where the sustain-
ability indicator is lower than 0.45. At the extreme, if the policymaker were extremely averse to upside risk, 
all cells below 0.50 would be italicized, signaling more worrisome cases than those shaded in Table 3.
20The dating of crises is problematic for Brazil and Turkey, because neither country defaulted. Although 
it would be straightforward to extend the exercise to other dates, the dates chosen correspond to instances 
when sovereign spreads rose to very high levels (above, say, 1,000 basis points) at some point during the 
following year.PRIMARy SuRPLuS BEhAVIOR AnD RISkS tO fISCAL SuStAInABILIty
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This indicates that the endogenous debt-stabilizing response typically observed 
in emerging market economies was insufficient to prevent explosive debt dynamics, 
calling for significant fiscal adjustment efforts in Argentina and Turkey, and prudent 
fiscal management in Brazil. In contrast, our model nicely predicts the declining 
debt path that was effectively observed in South Africa.
This impression is confirmed by our sustainability indicator (Table 4), which 
exhibits low and declining values for Argentina and Turkey over the simulation hori-
zon. The situation in Brazil at end-2000 looked less alarming than that in Argentina 
and Turkey, although the dramatic decline in the indicator over the simulation hori-
zon signaled a rapid deterioration in the sustainability outlook. In sum, however, 
the proposed sustainability indicator would have been providing strong signals of 
impending troubles for Argentina and Turkey in 2000 and 1999, respectively, and 
signaling potential problems in the case of Brazil in 2000.21 As expected, South 
Africa exhibits a very high value of the sustainability indicator.
The outcome of simulation exercises is potentially highly sensitive to initial 
assumptions. The impact of plausible variations in our baseline assumptions on the 
sustainability analysis is reported in Celasun, Debrun, and Ostry (2006) for Argentina, 
Table 3.  Probabilistic Debt Sustainability Assessment 
(“Constant” policy scenario)
  t + 1  t + 2  t + 3  t + 4  t + 5
Debt ratio lower than in t
Argentina (t = 2005)  0.83  0.85  0.82  0.76  0.73
Brazil (t = 2004)  0.59  0.63  0.64  0.63  0.64
Mexico (t = 2004)  0.51  0.54  0.53  0.55  0.56
South Africa (t = 2004)  0.60  0.64  0.69  0.70  0.71
Turkey (t = 2004)  0.40  0.45  0.46  0.47  0.47
Debt ratio more than 10 percent of GDP higher than in t
Argentina (t = 2005)  0.06  0.06  0.10  0.15  0.20
Brazil (t = 2004)  0.00  0.05  0.10  0.15  0.19
Mexico (t = 2004)  0.03  0.08  0.11  0.16  0.20
South Africa (t = 2004)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.04
Turkey (t = 2004)  0.21  0.28  0.34  0.35  0.38
Sustainability index
Argentina (t = 2005)  0.78  0.79  0.74  0.65  0.59
Brazil (t = 2004)  0.59  0.60  0.57  0.54  0.52
Mexico (t = 2004)  0.50  0.50  0.47  0.46  0.45
South Africa (t = 2004)  0.60  0.64  0.69  0.68  0.68
Turkey (t = 2004)  0.32  0.32  0.30  0.30  0.29
Source: IMF staff calculations.
21As already mentioned, it would be worth repeating the exercise for Brazil for 1998 and 2001, which 
are arguably more plausible dates ahead of crises in the following years.Oya Celasun, Xavier Debrun, and Jonathan D. Ostry
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Brazil, and Turkey. Robustness checks include a change in the specification of the 
fiscal reaction function along the lines suggested in Section II, the use of parameters 
from the SGMM estimates of the linear reaction function, a deterministic primary 
surplus path, and the use of a risky foreign interest rate (in lieu of the U.S. rate). The 
first two tests did not materially affect the risk analysis performed above, but the latter 
two suggest that (1) the deterministic policy assumption leads to underestimation of 
risks, and (2) the use of risky foreign interest rates significantly widens fan charts.
Implications of the Analysis
The analysis in this section shows that our simulation algorithm could be easily applied 
to various emerging market economies in order to help develop a “risk-management” 
approach to public debt sustainability. The central idea was to provide policymakers 
with graphic representations (in the form of fan charts) that summarize the distribu-
tion of public debt, as well as numerical sustainability indicators that take into account 
characteristics of this distribution, notably the probability that debt will decline over 
some horizon and the probability that upside risks to the debt ratio will be limited.
Figure 4.  Fan Charts on the Eve of Troubled Times
(“Constant” policy scenario) 
Argentina at end-2000
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
1This uses the “U.S. junk bond” rate as the relevant foreign interest rate. Other specifications of the 
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The algorithm we proposed was also used to generate fan charts and numerical 
sustainability indicators on the eve of crises in order to check whether our approach 
would have provided credible early warning to policymakers: the indicator we 
developed indeed was flashing bright red on the eve of crises, and the fan charts give 
an equally supportive visual impression of the prospect of troubled times ahead. 
The analysis also illustrates the extent to which fiscal policy—summarized in the 
estimated fiscal reaction function—provides adequate insurance to stabilize the 
debt ratio in the face of shocks (on the eve of the above crises, it clearly did not). 
The algorithm is also flexible enough to study alternative scenarios and assess their 
implications for risks to debt dynamics.
IV.  Conclusions
This paper has developed an algorithm for generating an explicit risk analysis of 
debt dynamics and applied it to five emerging market economies. The method builds 
on the standard approach to debt sustainability used at the IMF and elsewhere by 
accounting for country-specific risk factors regarding the economy and the fiscal 
policy process. Overall, we obtain a more complete, objective, and realistic assess-
ment of risks than is possible with nonstochastic DSA templates, which rely on a 
few deterministic and standardized bound tests.
Table 4.  Probabilistic Debt Sustainability Assessment:  
Looking Back at the Eve of Troubled Times 
(“Constant” policy scenario)
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005
Debt ratio lower than in 2000 (1999 for Turkey)
Argentina  . . .  0.07  0.11  0.13  0.17  0.18
Brazil  . . .  0.71  0.66  0.61  0.59  0.58
South Africa  . . .  0.87  0.93  0.96  0.95  0.95
Turkey  0.18  0.14  0.12  0.09  0.10  . . .
Debt ratio more than 10 percent of GDP higher than in 2000 (1999 for Turkey)
Argentina  . . .  0.24  0.60  0.68  0.72  0.75
Brazil  . . .  0.01  0.06  0.14  0.20  0.25
South Africa  . . .  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Turkey  0.19  0.64  0.73  0.80  0.83  . . .
Sustainability index
Argentina  . . .  0.06  0.04  0.04  0.05  0.05
Brazil  . . .  0.71  0.63  0.53  0.47  0.44
South Africa  . . .  0.87  0.93  0.96  0.95  0.94
Turkey  0.14  0.05  0.03  0.02  0.02  . . .
Source: Authors’ calculations.Oya Celasun, Xavier Debrun, and Jonathan D. Ostry
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Our approach introduces greater realism in three critical dimensions. First, it 
uses estimates of joint probability distributions of economic shocks to construct a 
large number of scenarios that capture covariances among disturbances as well as 
the dynamic response of the economy. Second, it allows for fiscal policy to adjust to 
these shocks (to debt and growth, for example) according to the pattern commonly 
observed in emerging market economies, as given by our estimated fiscal reaction 
functions; these functions also appropriately shift the focus of policy analysis from 
adjustments in the nominal primary balance to measures of fiscal effort (defined 
as the difference between the predicted and actual or projected surplus). Third, we 
allow for fiscal policy itself to be a source of risk.
The debt sustainability assessment proposed here is explicitly probabilistic and 
can prove useful for policymakers in a variety of ways. First, the method offers a 
flexible tool allowing policymakers to capture country-specific features relevant for 
debt dynamics, and to have clearer signals of the risks involved in delaying fiscal 
adjustment or undertaking fiscal expansions. Second, more complete information 
on the debt risk profile should in turn improve medium-term budgetary planning. 
Indeed, one would expect greater awareness of the risks to public debt to promote 
caution in the conduct of fiscal policy. For example, this could imply less reliance 
on debt to finance new expenditure programs, thereby reducing the likelihood of 
the dynamics spinning out of control as a result of macroeconomic risks such as 
lower growth or higher interest rates. In addition, an explicit quantification of risks 
could help in the design of consolidation strategies: governments could evaluate the 
merits of alternative adjustment plans not only in terms of their impact on future 
trends of debt, but also on the upside risks to the debt path itself. More generally, 
governments with low credibility and facing a volatile environment could better 
internalize the costs of policies implying higher debt ratios, whereas governments 
with greater credibility and facing a more stable environment could avoid taking 
excessive comfort in a benign baseline outlook.
Applications to five emerging market economies with different risk profiles 
illustrate the merits of our approach. In particular, we show how the fan charts 
and sustainability indicators can be used to guide policymakers in making judg-
ments about whether the present course of fiscal policy will or will not lead to 
problems (a crisis) down the road. Just as important, the estimated fiscal reaction 
functions—which connect fiscal behavior to various economic and institutional 
fundamentals—should also be of use in guiding policymakers on how to forestall 
problems by pursuing reforms that will shift the distribution of public debt paths 
that the economy faces. On both scores, the approach advocated here yields signifi-
cant value added relative to deterministic approaches that are still widely used to 
assess debt sustainability issues in emerging market countries.
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